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CONDITIONAL SALES OF CHATTELS
IN MARYLAND
By BRIDGEWATER M. ARNOLD*
The purpose of this article is to collect the law of Mary-
land regarding contracts of conditional sale of chattels as
found in Maryland statutes and in opinions of the Court
of Appeals of Maryland. Occasional pertinent decisions of
the Federal Courts are also to be considered. As Maryland
has not enacted the Uniform Conditional Sales Act it is
more than otherwise necessary to look to the decisions of
the courts and to scattered statutes. There are relatively
few cases in which the Maryland Court of Appeals has con-
sidered problems involving conditional sales.' As a result
of this paucity of decisions there are many problems arising
out of conditional sale transactions which are as yet unan-
swered by our Court. The answer to these must await
future cases in point.
DIvID D PROPERTY INTEREST
The term "conditional sale" as used herein embraces
the type of transaction in which the seller of goods delivers
the possession and use to the buyer while the seller retains
the property or title to the goods as security for the price
until the buyer has paid all installments of the full purchase
price. Such a conditional sale transaction is not considered
in Maryland to be against public policy.' The transaction
involves a divided property interest. The seller retains
the title while the buyer obtains the possession and use,
* A.B., 1923, Princeton University; LIUB., 1931, University of Maryland;
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.1 Thirty-seven cases have been found.
'Dinsmore v. Maag-Wahmann Co., 122 Md. 177, 89 At). 399, Ann. Cas.
1916A, 1270 (1914) ; Md. Code, Art. 83, Secs. 22, 39, 41.
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which is called by some authorities the buyer's beneficial
interest. This divided property interest has been recog-
nized by the Court of Appeals 3 and also by the motor vehicle
law of Maryland under which the term "owner" includes
any person, firm, association or corporation owning a motor
vehicle or having the exclusive use thereof under a contract
of purchase."
In the event of injury to the chattel by a third person
the vendor or his assignee has an interest in the chattel that
will enable him to sue the tortfeasor for damage to his inter-
est.5 The vendee's interest was recognized in a case where
a conditional vendor, having accepted possession of the
goods for the purpose of storage and it not appearing that
the vendee was in default, was held liable to the vendee for
conversion for selling the goods to a third person.'
Where the contract gives the vendor the right to assign,
his assignee acquires the assignor's rights. "The assign-
ment of the contract . . . by the seller carries with it the
right of property, together with the right of possession for
condition broken, . . ."7 After the vendor has assigned
the contract to an assignee, the assignor cannot rescind the
contract without the consent of the assignee, and an action
by the vendee against the assignor to recover back his money
"While the appellee (repairman) was chargeable with constructive
notice of the title reserved to the appellant (seller) by a contract of condi-
tional sale recorded under the provisions of the Act . . . yet it was appar-
ent that the purchaser was permitted to have the exclusive possession and
use of the car, and the repairs were essential to its operation," Myers v.
Auto Company, 143 Md. 107, 109, 121 Atl. 916, 30 A. L. R. 1224, 1225
(1923) ; and also, "No doubt is entertained that the buyer under a condi-
tional sales contract is, to paraphrase a clause of this sentence of section
54 (Art. 63), an owner or another person acting in the matter with his
express or implied authority. Although the seller has retained the legal
title as security for the payment of the residue of the purchase price, the
buyer is the substantial owner. It is he who has the control, possession,
care and maintenance of the machine . . . and this possession, use, and
custody is exclusive of everyone else but the seller or its assignee, and of
it only if and when he make a default in his obligation to pay or to perform
some of the terms of the contract looking to the preservation of the secur-
ity afforded by the reservation of the title in the article sold... "; Credit
Co. v. Marks, 164 Md. 130, 135, 163 Atl. 810, 812 (1933).
"'Md. Code, Art. 56, Sec. 173.
5 Barnes v. United Railways Co., 140 Md. 14, 22, 116 Atl. 855, 858 (1923).
For right of vendee to sue see 38 A. L. R. 1337.
'Besche v. Brady, 139 Md. 582, 116 AtI. 63 (1921).
Burrier v. Cunningham Piano Co., 135 Md. 135, 142, 108 Atl. 492, 494
(1919).
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could not be based on such rescission by the assignor."
Quaere, if the contract is silent as to the right to assign,
may the vendor or vendee assign his interest? Even when
the contract expressly restricts the vendee's right to trans-
fer his interest will such a transfer be upheld I9
Although the conditional sale contract may provide that
the buyer shall not remove the car from the state, such a
clause is construed to mean that the buyer may take the car
into another state if he-has the intention of returning to the
original state. In Credit Co. v. Marks,"0 the Court in con-
struing such a clause said that such a promise did not con-
fine the buyer of the automobile within the territorial limits
of his State but was entirely consistent with driving across
the boundary line with the intention of returning to the
State. Such provision whether statutory or contractual
was held only to import the idea of permanence in the
removal.1
In an action of replevin brought by the conditional
vendor to recover goods upon the vendee's default the
vendee is estopped from setting up as a defense the fact
that title and right to possession are in a third person, when
such third person has acquired his rights as a result of the
vendee wrongfully executing a mortgage on the goods.1"
RISK
There appear to be no decisions in Maryland on the risk
of loss in the event the chattel is damaged or destroyed
through neither the fault of the vendor nor the vendee.
The Uniform Sales Act which is adopted in Maryland pro-
vides:" "Where delivery of the goods has been made to
the buyer, or to a bailee for the buyer, in pursuance of the
contract and the property in the goods has been retained
Beam Motor Co. v. Narer, 141 Md. 187, 118 Atl. 401 (1922).
'See Vold on Sales, 277, 285; Commentaries on Conditional Sales, 2A
U. L. A. 31, 32, 40-51.
10 164 Md. 130, 140, 163 At. 810, 814 (1932).
11 But see Meyer Herson Auto Sales Co. v. Faunhauser, 65 F. (2d) 655
(1933). See also Md. Code, Art. 27, Sec. 210.IsPuffer Manufacturing Co. v. May, 78 Md. 74, 26 Atl. 1020 (1893).
18 Uniform Sales Act, Sec. 22A; Md. Code, Art. 83, Sec. 43A.
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by the seller merely to secure performance by the buyer of
his obligations under the contract, the goods are at the
buyer's risk from the time of such delivery.') 4
Where an automobile was deliberately destroyed by the
conditional vendor in an attempt to collect fire insurance,' 5
the vendor was enjoined from enforcing a confessed judg-
ment against the vendee for the balance of the price, there-
by, under these circumstances, putting the risk of loss on
the vendor. In this case the vendor because he still retained
the title contended that he could do as he pleased with the
property although the buyer should be responsible for the
purchase price. In disposing of this contention the Court
said:
"We cannot agree with that somewhat arresting propo-
sition, for it can hardly be said that the forcible seizure
and destruction of a machine for the purchase price of
which the appellee had given her note for $1,550 and
$30 in cash was as a matter of law no concern of the
appellee 's. "116
DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONDITIONAL SALES AND
OTHER TRANSACTIONS
From time to time the Court of Appeals has found it
necessary to distinguish between a conditional sale and
various other devices whereby one party to the transaction
seeks to secure himself by acquiring or reserving either the
possession or title to chattels.
1" That the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act are applicable to con-
tracts of conditional sale would seem to be implicit in the statement of the
Court of Appeals: "The validity of these so-called conditional sales,
where the contract provides that the title and ownership of the thing
sold, although delivered to the purchaser, shall not vest in him until the
purchase price therefor is paid, is recognized under what is known as the
Uniform Sales Act, Article 83, sections 22 and 39." Dinsmore v. Maag-
Wahmann Co., supra note 2. See also Williston, Sales, Sec. 1; Stieff v.
Wilson, 151 Md. 597, 135 AtI. 407 (1926). Lippel, Law of Sales, 55.
16 For a case where under particular terms of insurance policy condi-
tional vendee was denied right to recover for loss of piano from insurance
company because of insured's failure to disclose that the possessed piano
was under a contract of conditional sale, see Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v.
Weaver, 70 Md. 536, 18 Atl. 1034, 5 L. R. A. 478 (1889).
11 Michael v. Rigler, 142 Md. 125, 136, 120 Ati. 382, 386 (1923).
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Bills of Sale and Chattel Mortgages
In Dinsmore v. Maag-Wahmann Co.," the Court in hold-
ing that Art. 21, Sec. 44 (then Sec. 43) relating to the
recording of bills of sale and chattel mortgages had no
application to conditional sales, said:
"This provision, as we construe it, has no applica-
tion to conditional sales where the vendor parts with
the possession; the section referred to applies to cases
where the vendor, the owner of the property, sells the
property and retains possession of it. .... "
In Praeger v. Implement Co.,18 the Court said:
"A bill of sale is only required where the vendor
retains possession of the property sold, and a mortgage
is a conveyance of property by the owner to secure the
performance of a contract of the payment of a debt."
A contract for the sale of cans provided that the vendor
should retain title to the cans and in the event of the vendee
becoming financially embarrassed the debt should become
immediately due and the vendor should be entitled to have
delivered to it all the cans, filled or unfilled, remaining on
hand. The vendor then had the right to sell the cans and
their contents for the purpose of satisfying the debt. The
Court of Appeals decided that this arrangement constituted
a conditional sale as to the cans, the vendor having reserved
title, and that it was a mortgage as to the contents which
would be put into cans, the contents coming from a source
other than the vendor.19
If an agreement merely provides that only in the event
of non-payment the vendor is then to own the property, that
is, that the title may be given to the vendor sometime in the
future, it is not a conditional sale.'
1, 122 Md. 177, 182, 89 At. 399, 401, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 1270, 1273 (1914).
18122 Md. 303, 308, 89 AUt. 501, 502, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 1255, 1256 (1914).
1 Roberts & Co. v. Robinson, 141 Md. 37, -18 AtI.. 198 (1922)
soButler v. Gamon & Duvall, 53 Md. 333 (1879). See also Inslow v.
Disharoon, 5 AtI. 469 (Md. 1886), where on particular facts of case It was
decided there was not a conditional sale.
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Consignment for Sale
The fact that goods are consigned for sale with the pro-
vision that the factor may retain from a sale of the property
all the money in excess of the invoice price does not destroy
the relation of factor and principal and render the trans-
action a conditional sale. It is merely a bailment for sale.2
The Fourth United States Circuit Court of Appeals, in con-
struing a contract to determine whether it was a consign-
ment for sale or a conditional sale, said in Reliance Shoe Co.
v. Manly :2
"While it is true that the paper writing is called a
consignment, . . . still the contract must be construed
from a careful consideration of the entire language
employed in the document, and the court is not bound
by the name which the parties see fit to term themselves
in the contract. It is less difficult to arrive at a proper
construction by determining the benefits accruing and
the burdens borne by the parties. It will be seen that
the bankrupt had no right to return the merchandise
shipped for any cause and be discharged from liability,
except where the shoes failed reasonably to conform to
the sample or were not the sizes ordered. No right
was reserved to the Shoe Company to accept the unsold
merchandise and terminate the contract. The bank-
rupt was required at all events to pay the Shoe Com-
pany the invoice price of the shoes. . . There was no
reservation of title, except for the purpose of securing
the debt."
The Court held it to be a conditional sale.
The United States District Court for Maryland, speak-
ing through Judge Coleman, has said:
"The feature which distinguishes a conditional sale
from a consignment is that in the former the purchaser
undertakes an absolute obligation to pay for the goods,
while the latter is nothing more than a bailment for
sale. "12 3
21 Sturtevant Co. v. Dugan & Co., 106 Md. 587, 68 Atl. 351 (1907).
2225 F. (2d) 381, 383 (1928), an appeal from In re Eichengreen, 18 F.
(2d) 101 (1927).
20 In re Sachs, 31 F. (2d) 799, 800, 30 F. (2d) 510 (1929).
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Lease
At times an agreement may be entered into between
parties the exact nature of which it is difficult to determine.
An instrument which on its face purports to be a lease (and
hence not requiring recording) may upon analysis prove
to be a conditional sale in disguis6. Such a "lease" was
before the United States District Court of Maryland in the
case of In re Rainey; 4 the Court said: "In order to deter-
mine the true character of the agreement, it is necessary to
look through form to substance." And in determining that
the agreement in that controversy was not a lease but a
conditional sale, the Court pointed out that a lease contem-
plates the use of the property for a limited time and the
return of it at the expiration of that time; while a condi-
tional sale involves ultimate ownership by the buyer, the use
of it by him in the meantime.
CONFLICT Op LAWS
With respect to what law will govern the construction
and validity of a conditional sale contract the Court of
Appeals has indicated that the law of the place where the
contract is both made and to be performed will govern
unless enforcing that law will contravene the settled public
policy of the foreign state. In the case in question" the
Court indicated that it would thus give effect to the rights of
the seller or his assignee under a contract made elsewhere
even when the goods were in transit in Maryland in the
possession of the buyer, a non-resident of Maryland, so
long as doing so would not contravene our local policy.
RIGHTS OF THmD PRoSs DEATIG WITr THE VENDME
The divided property interest which results from the
conditional sale transaction is very often the cause of con-
flicting claims, not only between the vendor and the vendee,
,,31 F. (2d) 197, 199 (1929).
" Credit Co. v. Marks, 164 Md. 130, 141-2, 165 AUt. 810, 814 (1932). For
other cases where the facts could involve conflict of laws, see Motor Car
Co. v. First National Bank, 154 Md. 77, 140 Atl. 34 (1927); Gamby v.
Truck Corp., 156 Md. 19, 142 Atl. 596 (1928).
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but between the vendor and such third persons as bona fide
purchasers for value from the vendee, creditors of the ven-
dee, trustees in bankruptcy and receivers of the vendee's
estate, mortgagees and landlords of the vendee and persons
asserting liens on the chattel for labor and material.
Bona Fide Purchasers
A bona fide purchaser of a chattel from the conditional
vendee for value and without notice was protected in Mary-
land at common law and before the recording act.
Before the enactment of the Uniform Sales Act in Mary-
land, the Court, in Hall v. Hinks" treated the bona fide
purchaser from a conditional vendee in the same manner as
one who purchased similarly from another whose possession
had been obtained by fraud.
Also, in Lincoln v. Quynn," the Court recognized that
the common law view of many jurisdictions did not protect
the bona fide purchaser for value, but refused to follow
that view, and held that in Maryland such purchaser is pro-
tected.
In 1910 The Uniform Sales Act was adopted in Mary-
land, six years before the recording act was enacted. Sec-
tion 23 of the Sales Act28 may or may not have changed the
common law rule in Maryland, it depending what construc-
tion would have been placed on this section had it been
before the Court. Other jurisdictions differed in their con-
struction.29  It is certainly arguable that it did. In Praeger
v. Implement Company," the Court called attention to this
provision in the Uniform Sales Act but stated that it was
not necessary to determine whether the act changed the
rule.
2021 Md. 406, 418 (1864). See also Praeger v. Implement Co., 122 Md.
303, 89 Atl. 501, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 1255 (1914).27 68 Md. 299, 305, 11 Ati. 848, 849, 6 Am. St. Rep. 446, 448 (1887). See
also Central Trust Co. v. Arctic Ice Machine Co., 77 Md. 202, 222, 26 At.
493 (1893) ; same case, 79 Md. 103, 29 Atl. 69 (1894).11 Md. Code, Art. 83, Sec. 44.
20 Sheerer Gillet Co. v. Long, 318 Il1. 432, 149 N. E. 225 (1925) ; Anchor
Concrete Machinery Co. v. Penn. Brick and Tile Co., 292 Pa. 86, 149 Atl. 766(1928).
"0 Supra note 26,
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However, whether or not a bona fide purchaser for value
from the conditional vendee would have been protected be-
tween 1910 and 1916 is merely an academic question today
for in 1916 the recording act for conditional sale contracts
was enacted. 1 The effect of the statute is that if the con-
tract is properly recorded everyone is charged with notice
and hence there can be no purchaser without notice. Con-
structive notice is the equivalent of actual notice. 2 If the
contract is not recorded a bona fide purchaser for value
without notice is protected. An unrecorded contract of
conditional sale is valid as between the vendor and the
vendee."'
Resale
A type of case which occasions considerable difficulty
for the Courts is where an automobile is sold to a dealer in
automobiles under a conditional sale contract which is
recorded and then some third person purchases the auto-
mobile from the dealer without actual notice that the dealer
possesses the car under a conditional sale contract. If the
dealer defaults, the original vendor may attempt to retake
the car from the dealer's customer. It is certainly arguable
under these circumstances that if the original vendor knows
that the dealer is going to hold himself out to the public
as having authority and right to sell the car, the vendor
should be estopped from reclaiming the car from the
dealer's customer, and it has been so held in some jurisdic-
"Md. Code Supp., Art. 21, Sec. 55 (covering amendment of 1931). See
also Md. Code, Art. 17, Sec. 3 concerning Conditional Contracts of Sales
Docket; and Md. Code Supp., Art. 17, Sec. 59A concerning the size of type
to be used in contracts offered for recordation. See special provision for
recording of contracts of conditional sale of railroad equipment and rolling
stock, Md. Code, Art. 21, Sec. 93.
82 Finance, etc., Co. v. Truck Co., 145 Md. 94, 125 Ati. 585 (1924). It
has been decided by the Federal courts that registration of motor vehicles
with the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles does not take the place of
recording prescribed by Md. Code, Art. 21, Sec. 55 and hence is not notice.
In re Rosen, 23 F. (2d) 687 (1928); Meyer Herson Auto Sales Co. v.
Faunhauser, 65 F. (2d) 655 (1933). As to when a person may be charge-
able with notice, see Lincoln v. Quynn, 68 Md. 299, 305, 11 Atl. 848, 849, 6
Am. St. Rep. 446, 448 (1887).
:8 Stieff v. Wilson, 151 Md. 597, 135 Atl. 407 (1926).
'Md. Code Supp., Art. 21, Sec. 55; Robert & Co. v. Robinson, 141 Md.
37, 115 Atl. I98 (1922) ; Meyer Motor Car Co. v. First National Bank, 154
Md. 77, 140 Atl. 34 (1927).
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tions.85 Maryland, however, seems to have very definitely
decided to the contrary i. e. that the original vendor will
prevail in such circumstances. The Court of Appeals has
said:
"The plain answer to that contention (in favor of
the bona fide purchaser) is that the public policy of a
state is the policy which its people speaking through
their legislature adopt, . . . And in answer to the sug-
gestion that the operation of the statute under circum-
stances such as those involved in this case may result
in loss to an innocent purchaser for value, it is sufficient
to say, first, that if that is so, then it must be corrected
by the legislature and not by the Courts, and second,
that it is without substantial merit, because where such
an agreement is spread on the public records under the
provisions of a public general law, any person of ordi-
nary prudence would, by the exercise of reasonable
care, learn of its existence before purchasing property
affected by it. "6
In-this connection it might be noted that the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act which has been enacted in several
states and Alaska, although not in Maryland, protects the
bona fide purchaser of goods sold for resale even where the
contract has been recorded."
Oil Tank Co. v. Middlekauf,"8 also involved the question
of a resale by the conditional vendee of certain pumps to a
third person who had actual knowledge of the contract of
conditional sale. In this case, however, the vendee first
wrote to the vendor stating that he had failed in business
and had received an offer by a third person to buy the
pumps. The vendor replied to the vendee's letter advising
the vendee to sell, which the vendee did. The bona fide pur-
chaser prevailed on the theory of vendor's authorization of
the sale to him.
Value
In a situation where a bona fide purchaser for value will
be protected as against the conditional vendor, the question
S6 47 A. L. R. 82.
86 Finance, etc., Co. v. Motor Truck Co., 145 Md. 94, 99, 125 At. 585,
586 (1924).
27 U. C_ S. A., Sec. 9.
00 140 Md. 216, 117 At. 570 (1922).
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arises as to what constitutes value. The question whether
or not an antecedent debt is value arose in Stieff v. Wilson."9
The Court of Appeals pointed out that there had been pre-
viously no decision in the State on the question but that
the Uniform Sales Act had enacted 1 that an antecedent or
pre-existing claim whether for money or not constitutes
value. Although the Court did not emphasize it, the itali-
cized phrase might have been useful in the Stieff case be-
cause there the conditional vendee under an unrecorded
conditional sale transferred the chattel in question to the
third person (alleged bona fide purchaser) in satisfaction
of an antecedent contract for the delivery of such a chattel
rather than for the payment of money. The Court held this
sufficient value to make the third person a taker for value
and able to prevail over the vendor.
Quaere whether the statutory definition: "Value is any
consideration sufficient to support a simple contract . . ."
will be construed so that the mere giving of a promise
(which would be sufficient consideration to support a simple
contract) will be considered "value" even where it is not
performed before recording or notice?4 The Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Act4 solves this problem by pro-
viding that promissory value shall only constitute the one
giving it a holder in due course to the extent to which he
shall have performed before receiving notice. No such
specific exception appears in the Uniform Sales Act.
Creditors
The question often arises as to the rights of creditors
of the conditional vendee to satisfy their claims by execution
on or attachment of chattels of which the vendee is in pos-
session under a conditional contract of sale. It readily can
89 151 Md. 597, 602, 135 Atl. 407, 409 (1926).
,0 Cf. Ratcliff v. Sangston, 18 Md. 383 (1862).
1 Md. Code, Art. 83, Sec. 97. Consider also that the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Act uses practically identical language, Md. Code, Art. 13,
Secs. 14, 44. The latter uses "antecedent debt" instead of "antecedent
claim" and lacks the "whether for money or not" part. See 5 Uniform
Laws Annotated, Sec. 25 and notes.
1, See Williston on Sales, Sec. 620; Vold on Sales, 380.
4" Md. Code, Art. 13, See. 73.
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be seen that the divided property interest growing out of
such transactions, the title remaining in the seller but the
buyer having the possession and the use of the chattel, might
work a fraud upon creditors of the buyer because of the
ostensible ownership of the latter.
Before the enactment of the recording act in 1916 the
law in Maryland was that the claim of the conditional
vendor was superior to that of creditors. In Dinsmore v.
Maag-Wahmann Co." the conditional vendor was allowed
to prevail over an attaching creditor of the vendee. In
Praeger v. Implement Co.," the Court held that, short of a
recording act, "a conditional sale is ordinarily held to be
valid as against creditors of the buyer; and in some cases
this rule has been held to apply even though the creditor
is a judgment creditor.'46
In considering the rights of creditors, since the enact-
ment of the recording statute, 47 it will be convenient to
divide the creditors into those who gave credit to the vendee
prior to the conditional sales contract (antecedent creditors)
and creditors who gave credit after the conditional sale and
before the contract was recorded (subsequent creditors).
Antecedent Creditors
As to this class of creditors, in a contest with the condi-
tional vendor the latter will prevail even though the contract
is not recorded. The Court of Appeals in sustaining the
claim of the vendor under an unrecorded conditional sales
contract against judgment creditors of the vendee who had
levied on the chattel said:"
"All of the judgments of the defendants were on
debts arising out of transactions long prior to the date
of the conditional sales contract. The defendants
therefore are within the class designated as prior exist-
ing creditors, whom the recording laws were not in-
tended to protect. We said in Stieff v. Wilson, . . . 'It
is a recording statute, and it is to be presumed that it
"Supra, note 2.
"Supra, note 26.
Ibid; 122 iNId. 303, 311, 89 At. 501, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 1255, 1258 (1914).
"Md. Code, Art. 21, Sec. 55.
" Gunby v. Motor Truck Corp., 156 Md. 19, 25, 142 Ati. 596, 598 (1928).
198
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
does not intend any departure from the well known
American theory and purpose of recording claims to
title, that is, to protect persons who might subsequently
deal with the property and part with value for it with.
out notice of the earilier conveyance'."
The Court also pointed out that the same rule applied to
mortgages and went on to say that the mere fact the credi-
tors had reduced their claims to judgment or that they had
permitted the debts to remain uncollected or interest to
accrue after the conditional sale did not change the above
rule.
In view of Stieff v. Wilson" it would seem that if the
antecedent creditor had accepted the chattel itself in satis-
faction of his debt and he had no notice of the vendor's title
he could prevail on the theory he was a bona fide purchaser
for value, the value being the settlement of an antecedent
debt; but if, instead, the creditor without notice reduces his
claim to judgment and seeks to execute on the chattel he
cannot prevail. This seems somewhat paradoxical.
Subsequent Creditors
As to creditors who give credit to the vendee after he is
given possession under a conditional sale contract but
before it is recorded (subsequent creditors) what is the
result? In considering this question it may be advisable to
divide subsequent creditors into two classes: (1) those who
without actual notice of the conditional sale gave credit,
reduced the claim to judgment and had a fi. fa. issued or
attached the chattel before the conditional sale contract was
recorded and (2) those who without actual notice gave
credit before the conditional sale was recorded but did not
obtain judgment and execute on or attach the chattel until
after the conditional sale was recorded.
As to (1) the creditor will prevail over the conditional
vendor. In Motor Car Co. v. First Nat. Bank,0 a subse-
quent creditor of the vendee attached an automobile which
vendee possessed under a conditional sale contract. The
'9 Supra, note 39.
50 154 Md. 77, 140 At. 34 (1927).
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contract had apparently been recorded in New York where
the vendor and vendee lived. The attaching creditor was
a bank located in Maryland that had cashed a check for
vendee which had been returned protested. Due to lack of
proper certification the Court held that the evidence of re-
cording in New York was inadmissible and treated the case.
as if the contract had not been recorded in either New York
or Maryland. The Court decided that the attaching credi-
tor should prevail over the conditional vendor, on the
ground that the recording statute said "void as to third
persons without notice" until recorded."
As to the result in class (2), subsequent creditors who,
without actual notice, gave credit before the conditional sale
was recorded but did not obtain judgment and execution or
attach the chattel until after the conditional sale was re-
corded, there seems to be no decision of the Court of Ap-
peals in which this fact situation has come squarely before
the Court. However, there is language in Roberts & Co. v.
Robinson,5" which seems strongly to indicate that the credi-
tor will be protected as against the vendor. Or to state it in
another way, if the conditional sale contract is unrecorded
at the time the creditor gives credit and he is without actual
notice, he will prevail as against the vendor even though
the vendor records the contract before the creditor obtains
his judgment and executes on it. In the case mentioned the
contest was between the trustee in bankruptcy of the vendee
and the vendor under an unrecorded contract of conditional
sale. It was pointed out by the Court that the trustee as a
result of the 1910 Amendment to Section 47a of the National
Bankruptcy Act was in the position of a judgment creditor
holding an execution duly returned unsatisfied. However,
the Court did say on page 45:
"It is not necessary to determine generally in this
case the rights and remedies of judgment creditors
holding executions returned unsatisfied, but it is suffi-
61 See also Roberts & Co. v. Robinson, 141 Md. 37, 44, 118 Atl. 198 (1922)
For a Federal court's consideration of the question where there has been
recording outside of Maryland see Meyer Herson Auto Sales Co. v. Faun-
hauser, 65 F. (2d) 655 (1933). See also Commercial Credit Co. v. Foy
et al., (Baltimore City Court decision) referred to in note 59.
52 141 Md. 37, 43, 45, 118 Atl. 198, 200 (1922).
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cient to state our conclusion that they are entitled, in
view of our statute, to challenge a lien or title dependent
upon an unrecorded agreement of which they were un-
aware when their claims were contracted." (Italics
supplied.)"5
In the case of In re Rosen, 4 the United States District
Court for Maryland, speaking through Judge Soper, quoted
from Roberts & Co. v. Robinson and subsequently said:
"The Court of Appeals has given the statute a very
broad application, and has expressly said in Roberts v.
Robinson, supra, that it was intended to protect, not
only purchasers and lienors, but also general creditors.
This interpretation goes further than the decisions of
many, if not most, of the state Courts in their con-
struction of similar statutes. Williston on Sales, Sec.
327a, says that, under the construction put upon most
such statutes, creditors will not prevail over the seller's
title, unless prior to registration thereof they have
acquired a judgment lien or have levied an attachment
or execution on the goods. The construction of the
Kansas statute by the Supreme Court of Kansas, fol-
lowed by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., is an illustration.
The reference by the Maryland Court of Appeals to
the rights of general creditors may perhaps be con-
sidered an obiter dictum, since they were represented
by the trustee in bankruptcy, who, as already pointed
out, had the status of a lien creditor. Nevertheless,
the language of the court is so clear and unmistakable
as to furnish a safe guide for this Court until it is
modified in a subsequent case."
"The Court said also: "As between the immediate parties the contract
Is valid, but 'as to third persons without notice' it is declared to be void
until placed upon the public records in the manner prescribed. The credi-
tors who trusted Keel (vendee), in ignorance of the plaintiff's secret
reservations of interest in the property which they committed to his
apparent ownership, were undoubtedly included among the 'third persons
without notice' for whose protection the act was passed. If it had been
intended to protect only purchasers and lenors, that purpose would have
been expressed.. The general terms employed indicate that the statute
was designed to safeguard the interests of all persons, acting without
notice of the unrecorded contract, who would be injuriously affected If
it were permitted to be enforced." 141 Md. 37, 43.
5'23 F. (2d) 687, 6889 (1928), quoting the paragraph here quoted,
supra, note 58.
91 See also In re Shipley, 24 F. (2d) 901 (1928).
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It might be noted that the Court of Appeals in Roberts
& Co. v. Robinson took cognizance of Bailey v. Baker Ice
Machine Co.; cited in the -foregoing, but pointed out that it
and the other cases cited were to be distinguished on the
ground of different content of the recording statutes in
question, in that they required that the creditor, in order to
prevail over the vendor, must fasten a lien on the chattel
before the recording."
It conceivably might be argued that the language of the
Court of Appeals in Motor Car Co. v. First National Bank5 '
could be construed to mean that a subsequent creditor has
no higher claim than the vendor before the contract is re-
corded and that if recorded before the subsequent creditor
obtains a lien the vendor will prevail. The language which
is referred to is:
"In this respect Williston on Sales (2nd Ed.) Sec.
304, says the buyer has 'exactly the same power over
them and right in regard to them that he would have if
he had bought them and mortgaged them back to secure
the price.' Defectively executed or unrecorded chattel
mortgages have been held to be preferred in this state
as to prior existing creditors, equal to general subse-
quent creditors, but subject to later lien creditors
whose liens were duly executed and recorded or se-
cured. "
The Court then cited three cases5" which, on examination
seem hardly to support the construction suggested at the
beginning of this paragraph.
What would be the result, if after credit had been given,
the conditional vendor repossessed the chattel, there being
no recording, in the event the creditor tried to follow the
chattel into the vendor's possession to satisfy his claim?
This question appears not to have been directly answered
in Maryland, although some of the language used and the
56 141 Md. 37, 50, 118 At. 198, 202 (1922).
5,154 Md. 77, 82, 140 Atl. 34, 36 (1927).
58Tyler Co. v. O'Ferrall, 153 Md. 353, 138 Atl. 249 (1927); Textor v.




attitude of the Court of Appeals in Roberts & Co. v. Robin-
son may indicate that the subsequent creditor would be
given priority over the vendor.
Before leaving the consideration of the rights of credi-
tors a few queries will be stated, the answers to which do
not seem to have been given by the Court of Appeals: (1)
Has the conditional vendor an interest in the chattel such
that his creditors may reach it? (2) Has the conditional
vendee, under a recorded contract, an interest in the chattel
such that his creditors may reach it?59 (3) If creditors of
the vendee may satisfy their claims out of the vendee's
interest, can the vendor by appropriate terms in the con-
tract prevent creditors of the vendee from satisfying their
claims? (4) If these interests are available to creditors
what procedure should they pursue in order to subject the
respective interests to the satisfaction of their claims ?7o
Bankruptcy
In the event the vendee goes into bankruptcy what will
be the result in a contest between the conditional vendor
and the trustee? Prior to 1910 the conditional vendor
would prevail.6 1
The law after 1916, when the recording statute was en-
acted, was involved in the case of Roberts & Co. v. Robin-
son."' There the vendors under an unrecorded conditional
sale brought an action of replevin, when they knew the
" Commercial Credit Co. v. Foy et al., in the Baltimore City Court
reported in The Daily Record, December 28, 1935, Judge Adams held that
where a truck purchased by a vendee living in North Carolina and prop-
erly recorded in that State was seized by a creditor of the vendee In Balti-
more under a non-resident attachment that the North Carolina conditional
vendor's claim was superior to the interest of the attaching creditor. The
Court held that if the attaching creditor desired he could pay to the vendor
the balance due under the conditional sale contract and thereafter proceed
against the property in the hands of the sheriff.
10 See Williston on Sales, Sec. 326; Vold on Sales, 282; 55 C. J., Sees.
1402-5; Commentaries on Conditional Sales, 2A Uniform Laws Annotated
35, 51.
61 "Under section 47a (2) of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U. S. C. A. Sec. 75),
It was the rule, prior to 1910, that the trustee, standing in the place of the
bankrupt, could have no greater rights than the bankrupt himself had .. .
"Therefore, If under the state law an unrecorded instrument was good
Inter partes, it was good against the trustee . . ." In re Shipley, 24 F.
(2d) 991, 992 (1928). See also Roberts & Co. v. Robinson, 141 Md. 37,
118 Atl. 198 (1922).
10 Supra, note 61.
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vendee was insolvent, three days before bankruptcy pro-
ceedings were instituted. The trustee intervened in the
replevin suit. The Court upheld the trustee's claim.
In the case of In re Rosen," the vendee being in bank
ruptcy, the conditional vendor filed a petition in the bank-
ruptcy proceedings claiming a lien for the unpaid purchase
price. The contract was never recorded and there were
subsequent creditors having claims. The Court said:
"It does not appear that any prior creditor changed
his position on the faith of the bankrupt's ostensible
ownership of the automobile. It may therefore be as-
sumed, for the purposes of this decision, that, although
the lien of the intervening petition was invalid as to
creditors who became such subsequent to the sale, it
was valid as to the parties thereto and the antecedent
creditors. So far as the trustee in bankruptcy repre-
sents subsequent creditors, it is clear that his claim is
superior to that of the petitioner."
The court then went on to hold that as the proceeds from
the car belonged to the trustee in bankruptcy they should
be distributed for the benefit of all the creditors, antecedent
and subsequent, and that the conditional vendor could claim
as a general creditor.
In another case arising in bankruptcy the conditional
vendor sold equipment to the vendee on December 28, 1925;
recorded contract on February 8, 1926; and on March 24,
1926, the vendee went into voluntary bankruptcy. The
vendor petitioned the bankruptcy Court for priority of
payment out of the proceeds derived from the sale of the
equipment. There being no evidence of any subsequent
creditors between the date of the sale and the date of the
recordation, the Court sustained the claim of the vendor
saying:
"The conclusion must therefore be that the peti-
tioner is entitled to his lien, except as to any creditors
who may have intervened in the period during which
the contract was unrecorded. But there is no proof
in the present ease that any such creditors existed, so
03 Supra, note 54.
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that petitioner should be preferred as against the trus-
tee in payment out of the proceeds in the hands of the
trustee. ' 64
A question that might occasion difficulty is whether or
not a retaking of the chattel by the vendor prior to the
vendee's bankruptcy would be considered as a preference.
The Court of Appeals has indicated, although it was not
necessary to the decision, that such a retaking under an
unrecorded contract of conditional sale, with knowledge of
the vendee's insolvency within a few days prior to the filing
of a petition in bankruptcy against the conditional vendee
is such a preference which the trustee in bankruptcy can
avoid. 5 This would seem to be an academic question if
there are any subsequent creditors without notice of the
vendee in the bankruptcy proceeding because the trustee
should be able to recover the goods under Sections 67a, 67e,
70e, supplemented by Section 47a of the Bankruptcy Act. If
there are no subsequent creditors in the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding but only antecedent creditors then the question of
whether such a retaking is a preference might become of
importance. It would seem quite possible for a Court to
hold that as to antecedent creditors there is no diminution
of the insolvent estate and hence no preference. 6
Receivers
As to the conflicting claims of a conditional vendor and
a receiver appointed to take charge of the assets of the
vendees who were partners, the Court of Appeals said:
"As an assignee for the benefit of creditors is not a bona
fide purchaser, neither can a chancery receiver be so re-
garded. ,s The decision in this case was rendered
" In re Shipley, supra, note 61, 993. For other cases involving the con-
sideration of Md. Code, Art. 21, Sec. 55 in bankruptcy proceedings see: In
re Eichengreen, 18 F. (2d) 101 (1927) ; Reliance Shoe Company v. Manly,
25 F. (2d) 381 (1928): In re Rainey, 31 F. (2d) 197 (1929) ; In re Sachs,
31 F. (2d) 799 (1929); In re Federal System of Bakeries of Md., 278 F.
523 (D. C.) (1922), 283 F. 1021 (C. C. A.) (1923).
65 Roberts & Co. v. Robinson, 141 Md. 37, 45, 118 Atl. 198, 200 (1922).
00 See Remington on Bankruptcy, Sees. 1636, 1636.50; Collier on Bank-
ruptcy, 1285, 1520. But see Hetherington & Sons, Ltd. v. Rudisfll, 12 Am.
Bankrtcy. Rep. (N. S.) (1928), 28 F. (2d) 713, 4th C. C. A. construing
North Carolina statute for recording contracts of conditional sale.
47 Praeger v. Implement Co., supra, note 26, at 122 Md. 810, 80 At. 506,
Ann. Cas. 1916A, 1257.
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prior to the enactment of the recording statute. There
appears to be no decision as to the effect of this statute on
the rights of a receiver when the contract has not been
recorded.68
Mortgagees
Contests between the conditional vendor of a chattel,
subsequently mortgaged by the vendee, and the mortgagee
have arisen in Maryland. Corse v. Patterson,9 the earliest
reported Maryland case involving a conditional sale which
the writer has found, involved this problem. In that case
Patterson sold two Negro boys to one Henrietta Briscoe in
the Spring of 1818. The vendee took the possession, but
the vendor reserved the property in the Negroes until the
full purchase price was paid. Subsequently Henrietta
Briscoe married one James Nowland, who mortgaged the
Negroes to James Corse. The vendor then brought an
action of replevin against the mortgagee. The Court af-
firmed the lower Court in giving judgment for the plaintiff-
vendor, saying: "The plaintiff did not, at the time of the
contract, part with his interest in the Negroes, .. .but
had a right to assert his c1aim .whenever he saw them pass-
ing into other hands, ..
There is nothing in the opinion to indicate whether the
mortgagee at the time the mortgage was executed had
knowledge of the vendor's reservation of title. If he did
not have knowledge then it would seem that the mortgagee
was in the position of a bona fide purchaser for value. If
this be so, then the Court in the cases of Hall v. Hinks,0
and of Lincoln v. Quynn,'1 must have reversed Corse v.
Patterson, for in Lincoln v. Quynn the court treated subse-
quent mortgagees without notice as bona fide purchasers
for value. and protected them from the claims of the
vendor. Counsel for the vendor in his brief in the Quynn
68 See 2A Uniform Laws Annotsted,.86; (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 494; (1927)
27 Col. L. Rev. 618.
69 6 H. & J. Us f1824).
T021 Md. 406 "18W).
1168 Md. 299, 11 AI. 848, 6 Am. St. R6p. 446 (1887).
Under the. Uniform Sales Act "purchaser" includes mortgagee and
pledgee, Md. Code, Art. 83, Sec.9 17 (1).
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case relied upon Corse v. Patterson but the Court made no
reference to the case in its opinion, nor did the Court in
Hall v. Hinks mention Corse v. Patterson. Both of these
decisions were rendered before the recording act, since the
enactment of which a recording will protect the vendor
against the mortgagee, and vice versa if there be no record-
ing and no actual notice.
In Central Trust Co. v. Arctic Ice Machine Co..7 ' bonds
were issued which were secured by a recorded mortgage
which provided that the mortgage was a lien on all the prop-
erty of the mortgagor and all machinery subsequently to
be affixed to the property by the mortgagor. Subsequently
the mortgagor purchased under a conditional sale contract
machinery which was erected on the premises of the mort-
gagor, the contract provided that in the event of default the
vendor could repossess the machinery. The mortgage be-
ing in default, the bondholders claimed that the installed
machinery was subject to the mortgage. The Court found
that the holders of all the bonds (except five bonds) had
knowledge of and were instrumental in making of the con-
ditional sale contract and accordingly protected the vendor.
Speaking of the five bonds unaccounted for, the Court
said :
"The remaining five the record does not disclose the
ownership of, but if they are in possession of bona fide
holders for value without notice, the decree in this case
will not affect their title."
Fixtures
The parties to a contract of conditional sale may agree
between themselves that the subject matter of the contract,
although annexed to the realty, shall not be deemed a fix-
ture, even though without such contract it would be so re-
garded."
When the subject matter of a recorded conditional sale
is so annexed to the realty as to be deemed a fixture, con-
flicting claims arise between the conditional vendor and
either landlords, mortgagees or purchasers of the realty.
73 Supra, note 27.
71 Ibid, 77 Md. 223, 26 Ati. 494.
75 Lewis v. Scblicter, 137 Md. 217, 112 Ati. 282 (1920).
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In Wurlitzer Company v. Cohen," the lessee of a theatre
held possession of premises under a lease which provided
that wli.en the lease expired everything on the premises
should belong to the landlord. The lessee purchased a pipe
organ under a conditional sale contract. The organ was so
annexed to the building and so incorporated therein that it
could be removed without causing damage. A contest arose
between the conditional vendor and landlord as to the right
to the pipe organ. The Court upheld the claim of the
vendor."
In Credit Co. v. Bldg. & Loan Assn.," the owners of a
piece of land, which was subject to a mortgage, had a
garage erected on the land. The contractor who built the
garage in order to secure payment to himself took notes
secured by a mortgage on the property and it was further
agreed that title to the garage, regardless of in what de-
gree it was annexed to the realty should not pass to the
70 156 Md. 368, 375, 144 AtI. 641, 644, 62 A. L. R. 35S, 364 (1928).
" Ibid, 156 Md. 375, 144 AtI. 644, 62 A. L. L 364: "As to the conditional
vendor, even if the organ could be considered as a fixture, the provision of
the lease, that property subsequently acquired by the tenant should at the
termination of the lease become the property of the lessor, does not give
the lessor a claim as against the conditional vendor .... The author of
the note in 37 L. R. A. (N. S.), 119, says: 'The preponderance of authority
is to the effect that where the removal of the fixture will not materially
injure the premises, a seller thereof retaining title thereto may assert his
right as against a prior mortgagee of the realty' . . . The author also
says: 'The fact that a prior mortgage of real estate contains a provision
that it shall cover additions thereto, does not give the mortgage a superior
claim to chattels annexed thereto as against the vendor by conditional
sale contract, since the after acquired property clause in a mortgage
attaches only to such interest as the mortgagor acquires,' . . . The reason
for the preponderant view, as expressed in one or more of them, is that
the title to the chattel never vested In the purchaser; and that It therefore
was not acquired by the mortgagee.
"And in 26 C. J., page 689, See. 60, in an article on fixtures, of which
Mr. Herbert T. Tiffany is the author, it is said: 'As against a lessor of
land, an agreement reserving the right of removal in favor of a person
selling articles to the lessee has been held to be effective, and the fact
that the lease provided that all improvements should belong to the lessor
. . . has been regarded as immaterial in this respect'; and in 24 R. C. L..
page 475, See. 769: 'It is the general rule that where a mortgagor of real
estate purchases chattels, such as machinery, under a contract whereby
the seller retains the title until the price is paid, and annexes such chattel
to the realty in such a way that as between himself and his mortgagee the
chattel becomes a part of the realty and covered by the mortgage, yet If
the annexation is in such way that the chattel may be removed without
injury to the realty, this will not enable the mortgagee to claim the same
under his mortgage as against the seller; and the fact that the mortgage
contains an after acquired property clause is held Immaterial."
" 160 Md. 280, 153 AtI. 64 (1930).
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vendees (land-owners) until the mortgage notes were paid.
A paper purporting to be a memorandum of the contract
was filed under the conditional sale recording statute. In
a contest between the original mortgagee and the condi-
tional vendor (contractor) the Court upheld the claim of
the original mortgagee of the realty. It decided that the
garage had become so incorporated in the realty as to be-
come a part of it and that it could not be removed without
material injury to it. The Court said that the provision
in the conditional sale contract was not binding on the
original mortgagee unless he consented.
In Realty Co. v. Sales Corp.7 the vendees under a con-
tract of sale for the purchase of a house and lot went into
possession and while in possession had an oil burner in-
stalled under a conditional sale contract. The vendees be-
ing unable to fulfill their contract to purchase the house and
lot, surrendered the premises to the vendors. A contest
then arose between the vendor of the oil burner and the
vendors of the land whether the installed oil burner had
become a part of the realty. The Court decided that the
tank, control and burner had remained personalty but that
some of the piping installed had become realty, and said :80
"The circumstances that the three movable articles,
although their detachability remains, are connected
with immovable articles or fixtures, no more make those
movables annexed as parcel of the freehold than do the
gas fixtures and ranges or the electric light fixtures
and heaters become a part of the realty merely because
they, although preserving their detachability, are af-
fixed to the frequently less expensive gas pipes and
electric light wires which are admittedly a part of the
freehold ..
In Finance Corp. v. Bldg. Assn.,81 the owners of real
property which was subject to a mortgage, installed a hot
water heating system which they purchased under a condi-
tional sale contract which was recorded. A foreclosure
sale was had and the conditional vendors excepted to the
"9 163 Md. 541, 163 A. 841 (1933).
80 Ibid, 168 Md. 549, 163 At. 844 (1963).
81167 Md. 22, 173 A. 198 (1934).
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sale. The Court, after first deciding that the chattel-
vendor's remedy was by way of replevin if the chattels
continued to be personalty then held that the heating sys-
tem had become a part of the realty. The Court said:
"When a chattel is incorporated in the structure
and becomes an integral part of the realty, it not only
loses its character as personal property but the benefit
of any notice which follows from recordation as
well. ' 82
In the case of Abramson v. Penn," the vendor sold a
number of gas steam radiators to vendee under a condi-
tional sale contract which was duly recorded. Each radi-
ator was a separate unit being connected only with the gas
supply pipe. The vendee sold the garage to one Abramson.
Abramson, in a contest with the conditional vendor, con-
tended that the radiators having become fixtures the re-
cording of the contract was not effectual as notice to him.
The Court under the facts in the case sustained the condi-
tional vendor. After stating that the recordation would
not protect the vendor if he knew or anticipated that the
chattel would be affixed to the realty, and that recordation
would protect the vendor if he did not consent to annexation
or could not reasonably anticipate annexation, the Court
said :8
"For instance, if one sold a number of domestic
sewing machines under a conditional sales contract,
the vendee could not, by permanently annexing them
to a freehold without the vendor's assent, change their
essential character as personal property, and one buy-
ing the realty to which they were annexed would be
bound to take notice of that fact. But on the other
hand, if one sold a steam heating system which, if used
at all, must necessarily be permanently annexed to and
incorporated with some freehold, he would be bound to
know that when so incorporated it would lose its char-
acter as personalty and become real estate, and that
"2 Ibid, 167 Md. 225, 173 Atl. 199 (1934).
as 156 Md. 186, 143 Atl. 795, 73 A. L. . 742 (1928), see page 192 of this
case for a quotation from Ewell on Ftitures which considers the rights of
creditors levying on the land.
8 Tbid, 156 Md. 194, 143 Atl. 798, 73 A. L. R; 747.
210
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
the purchaser of such real estate would not be charged
with notice of any lien or claim not recorded among the
land and mortgage records."8 '
From the cases above considered are we not justified in
drawing the conclusion that if the chattel, though annexed
to the realty, can be severed from it without damage to the
realty, then the conditional vendor should prevail over the
mortgagee, etc., but that if the subject matter of the condi-
tional sale becomes so annexed to the realty that it cannot
be removed without injury thereto then the mortgagee, etc.,
should prevail? And should not the above statement be
qualified by saying that the mortgagee, etc., should prevail
only when the vendor knew or should reasonably anticipate
that the subject matter would be so installed that it's re-
moval would cause injury to the realty; but that if the
vendor did not know or should not reasonably anticipate
such a result, then the vendor should prevail even though
the vendee so installed the subject matter that it could only
be removed with injury to the premises, basing the latter
qualification on the reasoning set forth in Abramson v.
Penn? It would seem prudent in view of the above quoted
case, for the vendor where he is in doubt as to whether or
not a chattel sold might be so annexed to realty as to be
construed a fixture to record among the land and mortgage
records, as well as under Art. 21, See. 55. This should
protect the vendor at least against persons dealing with the
property subsequent to such recordations.
Distress for Rent
Maryland has a statute" exempting certain property
from distress for rent. After enumerating the various
exempt chattels the statute provides that, except in cases of
81 In the same case the Court, in commenting on Art. 21, Sec. 55, said,
"It is not certain that it even requires that the written instrument con-
taining the sale or contract itself must be filed, because, although it states
In one place that the 'note, sale or contract' itself must be in writing ...
and be recorded, it later says that such recording shall be sufficient if a
'memorandum of the paper writing' setting out the amount due, when and
how payable, and a 'brief description of the goods and chattels,' be filed."
Ibid, 156 Md. 191.
81 Md. Code Supp., Art. 53, Sec. 18, Including amendment by Laws, 1935,
Ch. 206.
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personal property in office buildings, the landlord must as-
certain whether any goods, chattels or other personal prop-
erty distrained on are being purchased by the tenant under
a conditional contract of sale and if it shall be found that
any of such property is being purchased under such a con-
ditional contract of sale which shall have been properly
executed and recorded prior to the levy the landlord shall
either release such property from the distraint proceedings
or pay to the vendor the balance due him.
There appears to be only one decision of the Court of
Appeals which has considered the part of this statute re-
lating to chattels sold under a contract of conditional sale.
In the recent case of Wilhem v. Boyd s6a the Court of Ap-
peals held that where the conditional vendor repossessed
the property and cancelled the indebtedness with the con-
sent of the vendee and the chattels thereafter were per-
mitted to remain on the premises leased by the vendee, the
chattels could be distrained upon by the landlord. The
Court ruled that the protection afforded to the conditional
vendor by the statute just mentioned could not be invoked
by the owner of the chattels as there was no longer any con-
ditional sale relationship existing at the time of the dis-
traint.
Garageman's Lien
A problem that has had the consideration of the Court
of Appeals on several occasions is the question of the rights
of an unpaid garageman who, having repaired an automo-
bile on the order of the conditional vendee, asserts his
garageman's lien in conflict with the conditional vendor
who has sought to repossess the car.
In Winton Co. v. Meister,7 decided in 1918, the Court of
Appeals upheld the common law repairman's lien as
against the claim of the vendor of an automobile under an
unrecorded contract of conditional sale. The garageman
was without notice of the vendor's reservation of title. The
s
6
a 190 At. 823 (Md. 1937).
S7 133 Md. 318, 105 At. 801 (1918).
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Court said :" ,, . .. wherever the party has by his labor or
skill, etc., improved the value of property placed in his
possession, he has a lien upon it until paid."
In Myers v. Auto Company, 9 decided in 1923, the con-
tract of conditional sale had been duly recorded. In an
action of replevin brought by the vendor against the
garageman who was asserting a lien for repairs made at
the request of the vendee the Court again sustained the
garageman 's lien. The Court recognized the lien under
the Winton case and disposed of the contention that the
reservation of title was recorded by pointing out that the
purchaser was given the use of the car and that repairs
were essential to this permitted user. The Court worked
out an implied agency in the vendee to have repairs made
for the benefit of the vendor.
However, the Legislature, in 1924, amended the garage-
man's lien statute ° to provide that the lien shall be superior
to the rights of unrecorded conditional sale contracts, bills
of sale, or chattel mortgages but shall be subordinate to
properly recorded ones.
In Goldenberg v. Finance & Credit Co.,91 decided in
1926, the vendor sold an automobile to the vendee under a
contract of conditional sale which provided, among other
things, that the car should be kept in good condition, that
any repairs should be at the vendee's expense and that all
charges against the car should be paid by the vendee. The
contract was recorded. Subsequently the car was repaired
by defendant who had no actual notice of the conditional
sale. Asserting a lien for repairs, the defendant refused
to surrender the car to the vendor, the latter claiming the
car because the vendee was in default. Vendor brought an
action of replevin. In sustaining the vendor's superior
81 Ibid, 133 Md. 32D, 106 AtI. 302. The Court also held that even though
the garageman temporarily gave up possession of the car with the under-
standing it be returned (which it was,) no rights of innocent third persons
having intervened during the time the car was out of the garageman's
possession, the lien was not lost. See also the last sentence of Md. Code,
Art. 63, Sec. 54.
,9 143 Md. 107, 121 AtI. 916, 36 A. L. R. 1224 (192S).
90 Md. Code, Art. 63, Sec. 54.
91 150 Md. 298, 133 At]. 59 (192).
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claim, the court decided that the rule of the Myers case had
been changed by the subsequent statute. The court pointed
out that the statute had entirely changed the common law
rule as to the respective rights of garagemen and vendor.
The result of the statute and the decision in this latter
case would seem clearly to be that a conditional vendor of
a motor vehicle by appropriate terms in the recorded con-
tract can protect himself from a garageman's lien where
work is undertaken at the request of the vendee. Also, that
any garageman before undertaking to repair a car, if he
thinks he will have to assert a lien, should first search the
records of the county (or Baltimore City) where the vendee
lives.
However, if an automobile is sold by and purchased by a
non-resident vendor and vendee and the contract is re-
corded in the state where the non-resident vendee resides,
if a garageman repairs the machine in Maryland he may
assert his lien as against the vendor. In Credit Co. v.
Marks,"2 it was said: "Nor did the recording of the con-
ditional sales contract in the State of New York affect the
garagemen in Maryland with constructive notice."
In view of the decisions in the Winton Co. v. Meister,
and Myers v. Auto Co., recognizing a repairman's common
law lien and in view of the fact that Art. 63, Sec. 54 limits
itself solely to "motor vehicles" it is arguable that the
doctrine of Myers v. Auto Company will still be applicable.
to all chattels other than motor vehicles, thus enabling the
repairmen of radios, refrigerators, and similar articles to
assert liens over the claims of the conditional vendors, even
though the latter record their conditional sales contracts.
If the statute is strictly construed as being in derogation of
common law it would seem that the repairman should pre-
vail.
REMEDIES OF THE SELLER AND WAIVER
When a buyer is in default, the question arises what the
seller may do. If he repossesses the chattel either by
" 164 Md. 130, 134, 163 A. 810, 811 (1933).
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peaceable seizure or replevin, is that a rescission of the
contract? If it is to be considered strictly a rescission
should not the seller restore all payments to the buyer?
Or, if the seller may retake the chattel and keep all pay-
ments, if very little remains unpaid and the value of the
chattel is in excess of the unpaid amount, is it fair to the
buyer? On the other hand, if very little has been paid by
the buyer and the second hand value of the repossessed
chattel is considerably less than the amount remaining un-
paid by the vendee should not the vendor be entitled to pro-
ceed to judgment against the vendee for the unpaid amount
less the second hand value of the chattel? Will a retaking
of the chattel bar an action for damages or will an action
for the price bar a retaking? Or, will whatever remedies
the seller may have depend solely upon the specific terms of
the particular conditional sale contract, however harsh or
lenient these terms may be to the buyer? Although these
problems have been considered in other jurisdictions and
are taken care of under the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act9" they have been treated but slightly in the Maryland
Reports.
In Lincoln v. Quynn,"' the property of the vendee was
placed in the hands of a receiver appbinted by a Court of
Equity. A large portion of the purchase price remaining
unpaid, the vendor filed a petition in the Equity Court pray-
ing that the chattels should be delivered to him by the re-
ceivers; or, if the Court should think that the vendor was
entitled only to the balance of the purchase money which
was unpaid then that the receivers should be directed to
pay the vendor said balance, etc. The Court of Appeals
said :
"It was stipulated in the contract of sale that if
Hoover made default in any credit payments, Lincoln
might reclaim and take possession of the goods, and
that all payments which had been made up to that time
should be forfeited. A Court of Equity will not lend
its aid to enforce a forfeiture of this kind. Against
92 See Commentaries on Conditional Sales, 2A Uniform Laws Annotated,
138-188; Vold on Sales, 280-295.
9"68 Md. 299, 11 Ati. 848, 6 Am. St. Rep. 4446 (1887).95Ibld, 68 Md. 306, 11 AU. 850, 6 Am. St. Rep. 448.
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persons liable to his claim on the property he could in
equity recover an interest in the goods equal to the
amount of the unpaid purchase money. . .'I
It is to be noted that this proceeding was in Equity and as
a general rule equity will not enforce what it considers to
be a forfeiture.
In the comparatively recent case of C. I. T. Corporation
v. Powell,"6 the vendee under a conditional sales contract
being in default, the vendor seized the chattel, sold it, de-
ducted the expenses of the resale and, after crediting the
vendee with the net amount realized on the resale, had
entered up a judgment for the balance in reliance on a con-
fessed judgment note which the vendee had executed. The
vendee filed a motion to strike out the judgment. The
Court of Appeals decided that there was no authority in
the contract which authorized such confession of judgment,
inasmuch as the warrant of attorney in the note was not ap-
plicable to such a case, because the damages were neither
liquidated, nor susceptible of liquidation without reference
to matters extrinsic to the note, and then went on to say 97
"From so much of the contract of sale as is recited
above, it appears that in the event of the buyer's de-
fault, under its terms, the seller could pursue in the
alternative any one of three remedies: (1) He could
take possession of the property, cancel the contract,
retain all payments received on account of its purchase
as liquidated damages for the rental of the property,
and sue the buyer for any sums for which he is in de-
fault, at the time the apparatus was so taken; (2)
recover from the buyer as agreed damages for 'breach-
ing the contract', the unpaid balance of the note; and
(3) pursue any other legal remedy.
"Appellant elected to follow the first remedy, took
possession of the soda fountain, sold it, charged the
appellee with what he refers to as 'costs' incurred in
connection with the sale, and credited him with the
net balance. By that action it necessarily abandoned
the right to any of the other remedies open under the
contract, except the right to recover any sums in de-
9o 166 Md. 208, 170 At. 740 (1983).
Of Ibld, 166 Md. 214, 170 Atl. 742.
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fault, for they were not cumulative but in substitution
for each other. And while the contract stipulated that
the buyer should pay to the seller 'any sums for which
he is in default' at the time the apparatus was taken,
that liability could only have been enforced in an ordi-
nary action at common law on the contract."
From the two cases above quoted, it is possible to infer
that in Maryland the seller will be permitted to enforce
whatever remedies are stipulated for in the contract, except
that if it is necessary for him to assert his claims in Equity
the latter Court will not enforce what it may consider to-be
a forfeiture.
In Rosenstein v. Hynson,"5 the time for the payment of
all installments having passed and $200.51 then being due,
the conditional vendor sued for only $87.43, recovered judg-
ment for that amount which was paid. Subsequently, be-
cause of the vendee's failure to pay the installments
amounting to $113.80, the vendor brought a suit to replevin
the chattel. The Court, in denying the vendor's right to
recover, said :
"In suing for a part only of the installments in ar-
rears, when he was entitled to sue for all, the plaintiff
disregarded the sound and settled rule that a fully
accrued cause of action for the breach of a single con-
tract must not be subdivided for the purposes of sepa-
rate suits against the same party. The object of the
rule is to protect a defendant from the vexations and
burdens incident to a duplication or multiplication of
actions to enforce a liability for which one suit would
be sufficient. The consequence of a violation of the
rule is that a judgment recovered for part of the ac-
crued indebtedness sued for separately may be pleaded
to a suit for the residue of the claim, which is treated
as being merged in the recovery procured in the first
litigatibn .... "I"
157 Md. 626, 147 AtI. 529 (1929).
o Ibid, 157 Md. 628, 147 Ati. 529.
10 Also, in this case it was held that the fact that the contract provides
that the extension of the time for payment of installments, or the accept-
ance of smaller amounts, or that their payment at different times should
not be construed as a waiver of any of the vendor's rights, does not alter
the above rule.
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If the vendor gives the vendee an extension of time for
the payment of an installment, the vendor cannot before the
expiration of the extension seize the chattel because of the
buyer's default. To a seller's contention that there was
no consideration for the extension the Court of Appeals has
said :101
"In these cases of conditional sales, the acceptance
by the seller of an instalment of the purchase money
after default is a recognition of the contract as still
subsisting, and a waiver of the forfeiture. . . . And
other acts than acceptance may have the same effect.
* . . A party cannot take two inconsistent positions.
If he has a right either to rescind a contract on account
of a breach by the other party or to continue it in force,
and he elects to continue it in force, he thereby aban-
dons the right to rescind and is bound by the election
so made."
However, the Court has also said :112
"The acceptance by the plaintiff (vendor) of a num-
ber of payments which were less than the amount spe-
cified in the contract did not amount to a waiver of its
rights to enforce the contract upon a further breach
by the refusal or failure of the defendant to make any
further payment on account of the purchase price....
CRIMINAL PROVISION
It is a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprison-
ment, for the purchaser of personal property under a condi-
tional written contract to remove it beyond the city or
county where it is located when purchased, or to secrete,
hypothecate, destroy or sell the personal property with the
intent to defraud the vendor, without first obtaining the
latter's written consent. °3
101 Cole v. Hines, 81 Md. 476, 479, 32 At. 196, 197, 32 L. R. A. 455, 462
(1896).1 0 2Burrier v. Cunningham Piano Co., 135 Md. 135, 143, 108 AtI. 492, 495
(1919)
log Md. Code, Art. 27, Sec. 210.
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WARRANTY
Are the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act' °4 regard-
ing warranties, express and implied, applicable to goods
sold under contracts of conditional sale? It would seem
that this question must be answered in the affirmative. The
language of the Court of Appeals referred to earlier in this
article' ° would seem clearly to bring such sales within the
purview of the Sales Act and therefore subject to its vari-
ous provisions. This would also seem to follow from a
case involving the sale of an oil burner where under the
terms of the contract title was not to pass to the purchaser
until full payment and under the terms of payment provi-
sion was made for monthly payments over a period of time.
Although the Court in its opinion did not refer to this
transaction as a conditional sale, by its terms the contract
would seem clearly to come within that category. The
Court in deciding the case applied various sections of the
Sales Act dealing with warranties.0 6
CONCLUSION
In conclusion the question inevitably arises as to the
advisability of Maryland adopting the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act."0 7 This Act, while adopted in some jurisdic-
tions, notably New York, Pennsylvania, and some other
commercially less important states, has not as yet received
the widespread acceptance throughout the United States
which has attended the Uniform Sales Act. 0 8
The enactment of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act in
Maryland would, of course, help to bring about uniformity
on the law of conditional sales throughout the United
States. This is an objective which is generally considered
"' Md. Code, Art. 83, Secs. 32-37, 70, 90.
105 Dinsmore v. Maag-Wahmann Co., supra, note 2, as quoted supra
note 14.100 May 011 Burner Corp. v. Munger, 159 Md. 605, 152 Atl. 352 (1930).
See also Williston on Sales, Sec. 607; 1 Uniform Laws Annotated, Sec. 13,
notes.107 See 2 Uniform Laws Annotated.
28 For a puzzling reference to the Uniform Conditional Sales Act (which
Maryland has not enacted) see Oil Tank Co. v. Middlekauff, 140 Md. 216,
218, 117 At. 570, 571 (1922).
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to be desirable in matters commercial. It would also tend
to centralize the law on the subject and thus make the law
more immediately available from the standpoint of re-
search into the authorities.
Section 9 of the Uniform Act, dealing with conditional
sale of goods for resale, might be a desirable step forward.
Sections 16 to 25, dealing with the rights and remedies of
the seller and the buyer when the buyer is in default, would
have the advantage of definitely letting us know what these
rights and remedies are. Under the present scarcity of
decisions by the Court of Appeals there would seem to be
room for considerable doubt as to the law of Maryland to-
day on these points. The protection given to the buyer,
particularly the buyer who has paid at least fifty per cent
of the purchase price, under Sections 19 and 20 might be
desirable.
On the other hand, the fact that there does not seem to
be any particular agitation for reform in the field of condi-
tional sales (at least none has come to the writer's atten-
tion) may be a fairly good indication that the people of
Maryland are satisfied with the present operation of con-
ditional sales transactions. It is possible, of course, that
this ostensible lack of agitation may be due simply to the
fact that the isolated vendees have no agency through
which to make their dissatisfaction vocal.
The absolute requirement of the Uniform Act for a re-
sale of the chattel if the vendee has paid at least fifty per
cent of the purchase price, and for a resale at his option if
he has paid less, could readily turn out to be a boomerang
to the vendee. The vendor might well feel that the red
tape and nuisance involved in such a resale would justify
him in availing himself of Section 22 which authorizes him
to recover any deficiency due on the contract, after deduct-
ing the expenses of the sale, of retaking, and of storing,
from the proceeds of the resale. While it is true, under
Section 21, that any balance left after all the above claims
and expenses are deducted goes to the vendee, neverthe-
less the quick depreciation which a chattel sustains by virtue
of having been used and become second-hand makes it
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doubtful if, in very many cases, there would be any surplus
left for the buyer.
Perhaps in most cases both the vendor and vendee would
prefer that upon default the vendor keep whatever pay-
ments he has received, that he retake the chattel, and that
both call it quits. This is a procedure which would not
always be possible if the Uniform Act were the law of the
State. Most of the other important provisions of the Uni-
form Act appear to be already taken care of in our law,
either through statutes or decisions of the Court of Ap-
peals. All in all, the present writer has some doubts as to
the advisability of adopting the Uniform Act in Maryland.
